

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 MMO-01 SIG-03 PER-01 A-01 ABF-01

SS-15 SP-02 AID-05 PC-01 OES-07 NSC-05 /053 W

-----015488 040854Z /11

R 031021Z MAY 78

FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7252

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 KHARTOUM 1999

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, AMGT, SU

SUBJECT: GOALS/OBJECTIVES AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: AMEMBASSY
KHARTOUM- PART I

REF: STATE 63477

I. AMBASSADOR'S OVERVIEW

1. SUDAN IS SITUATED BETWEEN ARAB WORLD AND AFRICA AND ALSO BETWEEN TWO VERY VOLATILE REGIONS, MIDDLE EAST AND HORN. IT ALSO LIES ASTRIDE IMPORTANT OIL TANKER ROUTES AND ACROSS RED SEA FROM SAUDI ARABIA. SUDAN IS ONE OF POOREST, LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF WORLD AND YET COULD BECOME MAJOR FOOD PRODUCER AND PROBABLY AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT SOURCE OF OTHER STRATEGIC MATERIALS AS WELL, INCLUDING POSSIBLY PETROLEUM. SUDAN IS MODERATE POLITICALLY, INTERESTED PRIMARILY IN DEVELOPING ITS VAST POTENTIAL. HOWEVER, IT FACES SERIOUS SECURITY THREATS FROM HOSTILE NEIGHBORS WHO ARE HEAVILY ARMED BY SOVIET UNION. IN ETHIOPIA LARGE NUMBERS CUBAN TROOPS AND SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS ARE STATIONED. SUDAN IS FRIENDLY TO U.S. AND WISHES TO COOPERATE WITH US IN ALL FIELDS.

2. OUR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES HERE ARE TO ASSIST THE COUNTRY TO DEVELOP ITS ECONOMY SO THAT WORLD CAN BENEFIT
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FROM SUDAN'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO SUPPLY OF FOOD AND OTHER NEEDED MATERIALS. WE ALSO WISH TO GAIN FULL ADVANTAGE OF SUDAN'S MODERATING INFLUENCE IN MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA. A FRIENDLY SUDAN, GIVEN ITS SIZE AND LOCATION, IS STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT TO U.S. AND ITS ALLIES IN AREA. TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR U.S., TOGETHER WITH OTHER ARAB AND EUROPEAN

FRIENDS OF SUDAN, TO PROVIDE NOT ONLY POLITICAL SUPPORT BUT SOME MEASURE OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HOW THIS ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE PROVIDED AND WHAT LEVEL SHOULD U.S. ASSISTANCE REACH ARE MAJOR QUESTIONS. ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE PRINCIPAL DETERMINANTS OF WHAT SIZE MISSION IN KHARTOUM SHOULD BE, ALTHOUGH AT PRESENT IT SEEMS TO BE GOING OTHER WAY, I.E., AS LONG AS REQUESTED STAFFING ASSISTANCE IS NOT PROVIDED IT APPEARS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT PROGRAMS WE WISH CONDUCT (MOST OF WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROVED AT POLICY LEVEL) CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT.

3. IN TERMS OF BROAD POLICIES, U.S. AND SUDAN ARE GENERALLY IN AGREEMENT. WE SHARE SIMILAR VIEWPOINTS RE MAJOR MIDDLE EAST, HORN AND OTHER AFRICAN POLITICAL ISSUES, AND SUDAN HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS. SIMILARLY, U.S. AND SUDAN GENERALLY AGREE ABOUT SUCH ISSUES AS ROLE OF PRIVATE SECTOR IN DEVELOPMENT. SUDAN PROBABLY SHARES THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD MOST NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES BUT THESE ISSUES HAVE NOT BEEN IMPORTANT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. SUDAN HAS NOT PLAYED IMPORTANT ROLE IN MULTILATERAL FORA WHERE SUCH ISSUES HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED. RECENT LIBERALIZATION OF SUDANESE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT CONSISTENT WITH U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD HUMAN RIGHTS. SUDAN WELCOMES STRONG CULTURAL RELATIONS AND DEEPLY APPRECIATES OUR CULTURAL ACTIVITIES HERE, NOTABLY IN EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE.
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4. IN SHORT, SUDAN WANTS CLOSEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH U.S. AND THERE LITTLE REASON FOR U.S. TO REFRAIN FROM ALLOWING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS TO DEVELOP FULLY. HOWEVER, SUDAN FINDS ITSELF SURROUNDED BY WEAK OR HOSTILE NEIGHBORS AND SOME ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES. IT ALSO FINDS ITSELF FACED WITH EXCRUCIATING ECONOMIC CRISIS THAT IS LARGELY FUNCTION OF ITS PRESENT STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. THEREFORE, SUDAN PRINCIPALLY INTERESTED IN U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE AT PRESENT.

5. APART FROM MODEST IMET PROGRAM, U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN HAS BEEN IN FORM OF SMALL NUMBER EQUIPMENT SALES WHICH HAVE BEEN TOTALLY FINANCED BY SAUDIA ARABIA. SALE OF SIX C-130 TRANSP
BT AIRCRAFT BEING IMPLEMENTED, AND SALE
OF ONE SQUADRON OF F-5S APPEARS IMMINENT. WE ALSO DISCUS-
SING SALE ASSOCIATED AIR DEFENSE RADARS AND RELATIVELY
MODEST SALE FIELD ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT.

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 MMO-01 SIG-03 A-01 PER-01 ABF-01
SS-15 SP-02 AID-05 PC-01 OES-07 NSC-05 /053 W
-----015520 040854Z /11

R 031021Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7253

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 5 KHARTOUM 1999

6. AID PROGRAM HAS TAKEN LONGER TO GET UNDERWAY, BUT WE NOW LOOKING TOWARD PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, PL-480 PROGRAMS AND POSSIBLY SECTOR SUPPORT THAT BY EARLY 1980S MAY TOTAL \$50-70 MILLION PER YEAR, I HAVE ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT WE INITIATE SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE TOGETHER WITH OTHER ARAB AND EUROPEAN DONORS; TOO EARLY TO SAY WHETHER CONGRESS WILL AGREE. IN ADDITION TO AID THERE IS BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE SUDAN WILL REQUEST PEACE CORPS PROGRAM, ALTHOUGH NO OFFICIAL, FORMAL REQUEST HAS YET BEEN MADE. WE INTEND TO REPLY POSTIVELY SHOULD REQUEST BE MADE.

7. WE ARE ESSENTIALLY AT BEGINNING OF MAJOR PERIOD OF GROWTH IN PROGRAMS HERE THAT IN TURN WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONS TO EMBASSY (STATE) STAFF IF THEY ARE TO BE ADMINISTERED PROPERLY. THESE PROGRAMS ARE RESULT OF TWO YEARS OF CAREFUL DELIBERATION IN WASHINGTON BY SEVERAL AGENCIES INCLUDING NSC AND DECISION MADE AT HIGHEST LEVEL USG TO "ACCELERATE SUPPORT TO SUDAN." THIS DECISION WAS MADE AFTER WEIGHING VARIOUS STRATEGIC, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS NOTED ABOVE. THUS, REDUCTION IN EMBASSY STAFF WOULD CALL INTO QUESTION OUR ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THESE PROGRAMS SINCE IT ALREADY IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO DO SO AT PRESENT STAFFING LEVEL.

II PACKAGES I- IV (ZBB CHARTS ARE AT PARAS 32-33)
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8. (1) DECISION UNIT: SUDAN

9. (2) PACKAGE I OF IV

10. (3) ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION: WE HAVE SELECTED 90 PERCENT OF OUR CURRENT LEVEL AT WHICH THE EMBASSY CAN ATTEMPT IN MINIMAL MANNER PURSUE AGREED U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AND CARRY OUT ESSENTIAL EMBASSY ACTIVITIES IN SUDAN. RANGE OF EMBASSY ACTIVITIES AT THIS LEVEL DIFFERS FROM CURRENT MIX IN DECREASE OF REPORTING AND SUPPORT FOR NON-STATE ELEMENTS OF MISSION WHICH IN TURN LIMITS ABILITY OF EMBASSY TO CARRY OUT POLICY OF ACCELERATING SUPPORT FOR SUDAN.

11. AT THIS MINIMUM LEVEL IT PROBABLY WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT TO ELIMINATE THE DCM AND DCM'S SECRETARY POSITIONS AND ESTABLISH A COMBINED POL/ECON SECTION. THUS, THE EXECUTIVE SECTION COULD BE REDUCED FROM 5 TO 3. THIS WOULD PLACE THE BULK OF THE DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE EMBASSY AS A WHOLE ON THE AMBASSADOR WHO WOULD ALSO HAVE HEAVIER COORDINATING, SUPERVISORY AND SIMILAR RESPONSIBILITIES.

12. BY PLACING THE POLITICAL OFFICER IN A COMBINED POL/ECON SECTION, ONE ECON OFFICER POSITION COULD BE DROPPED. AS FULL INTEGRATION TAKES PLAP IT PROBABLY WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPORTING OR REDUCED SERVICE TO AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN DEPENDING ON HOW THE WORK OF THE COMBINED SECTION IS ACTUALLY ALLOCATED. IT ALSO WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DROP ONE OF THE ECON SECTION'S LOCAL EMPLOYEES, PROBABLY THE TRANSLATOR.

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13. TO ALLOW MAINTENANCE OF AS HIGH A LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AS POSSIBLE IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO TAKE CUTS IN THE JAO WITH A VIEW TOWARD MINIMIZING DISRUPTION. WE WOULD HAVE TO DROP TWO LOCAL EMPLOYEES PROBABLY A DRIVER AND AN ASSISTANT IN GENERAL SERVICES. THIS WOULD ADD TO THE STRAINS OF AN ALREADY OVERBURDENED SECTION, HOWEVER.

14. (4) RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FY 78 FY 79 FY 80 CUMULATIVE

U.S. OFFICERS	10	9	8	8
U.S. STAFF	12	12	11	11
FSL'S	34	33	31	31
TOTALS	56	54	50	50

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 MMO-01 SIG-03 A-01 PER-01 ABF-01
SS-15 SP-02 AID-05 PC-01 OES-07 NSC-05 /053 W
-----015607 040855Z /11

R 031021Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7254

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 5 KHARTOUM 1999

15. (5) IMPACT ON CURRENT U.S. POLICY GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES: THE BASIC STRUCTURE BY WHICH OUR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES ARE SUPPORTED REMAIN INTACT. IN DECIDING WHERE TO MAKE REDUCTIONS, IT WAS FELT THAT REPORTING AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY TO NON-STATE ELEMENTS MUST BE MAINTAINED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THIS WAS DONE BY PLACING CONSIDERABLY HEAVIER MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES ON THE AMBASSADOR HIMSELF. IT STILL LEAVES THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION ILL EQUIPPED TO SUPPORT NEW PROGRAMS ESPECIALLY THOSE BY AID AND THEREFORE RAISES THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE CAN CONTEMPLATE A SIGNIFICANT AID (OR PEACE CORPS) PROGRAM AT THIS LEVEL. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY, SIMILARLY, EITHER ECONOMIC/POLITICAL REPORTING OR SERVICE TO BUSINESSMEN WILL SUFFER, BUT IT IS HARD TO SEE BOTH ACTIVITIES BEING MAINTAINED AT PRESENT LEVELS WITH THE CUTS ENVISAGED HERE IMPLEMENTED. THERE ARE TWO PRINCIPAL DEFICIENCIES WITH THIS PACKAGE. IT EFFECTIVELY ALLOWS NO ROOM FOR GROWTH AND YET, AS NOTED IN AMBASSADOR'S OVERVIEW, THIS IS DOMINANT CHARACTERISTIC OF U.S.- SUDAN RELATIONS AND IS DIRECT RESULT POLICY DECISIONS TAKEN AT HIGHEST LEVEL AFTER MOST CAREFUL SCRUTINY OF ALTERNATIVES. SECONDLY, PROBABLY MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF DCM, WHOSE POSITION WOULD BE ELIMINATED, IS TO ASSURE THAT ALL PROGRAMS OF EMBASSY BEGIN UNDERLINE ON DAILY BASIS END UNDERLINE ARE IN PHASE WITH EACH OTHER AND THAT AMBASSADOR, IN FACT AS WELL AS IN THEORY MAINTAINS CONTROL OVER ENTIRE MISSION. IN THIS SENSE DCM IS
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EXTENSION OF AMBASSADOR AND BY ELIMINATING DCM ONE SEVERELY RESTRICTS AMBASSADOR'S REACH AND CONTROL OVZR HIS MISSION.

THIS SEEMS UNWISE AT TIME WHEN NON-STATE AGENCIES ARE RAPIDLY EXPANDING. HOWEVER,(.CHANGES ELSEWHERE ARE EVEN MORE UNACCEPTABLE.

16. (1) DECISION UNIT: SUDAN

17. (2) PACKAGE II OF IV

18. (3) ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION: AT THIS LEVEL OVERALL MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION AT PRESENT LEVELS CAN BE RESTORED AND MORE BALANCE CAN BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN REPORTING AND SERVICE TO BUSINESSMEN. HOWEVER, IT STILL WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE ADEQUATELY TO SERVE NON-STATE ELEMENTS OF THE EMBASSY. SIMILARLY, CONSULAR AND COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES WOULD REMAIN STRAINED. UNDER THIS PACKAGE DCM/DCM'S SECRETARY POSITIONS WOULD BE RESTORED ALLOWING POLITICAL OFFICER TO WORK DIRECTLY UNDER DCM AS PRESENTLY IS DONE (AND THEREBY REDUCING PRESSURE ON ECON STAFF). JUNIOR ECON OFFICER POSITION WOULD BE RESTORED AS WELL. ECON FSL AND TWO JAO FSL POSITIONS WOULD BE DROPPED.

19. (4) WINGHVT#RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

	*6 78	FY 79	FY 80
		THIS	CUMULA-
		PKG	TIVE
		ONLY	
U.S. OFFICERS	10	10	- 10
U.S. STAFF	12	12	- 12
FSL'S	34	33	3 31
TOTAL	56	55	3 53

20. (5) IMPACT ON CURRENT U.S. POLICY GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES: SOMETHING CLOSE TO PRESENT
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PROGRAM LEVELS COULD BE MAINTAINED, ALBEIT WITH SOME STRAIN

AND DETERIORATION OF SERVICES (E.G. IN TRANSLATION AREA). MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, EMBASSY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE GROWTH. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FOR EXPANDING NON-STATE ELEMENTS WOULD BE SEVERELY STRAINED AND WE STILL WOULD HAVE TO QUESTION WHETHER AID PROGRAM IN PARTICULAR COULD BE MAINTAINED AT ANYTHING LIKE WE FEEL NECESSARY TO SUPPORT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES. SIMILARLY, COMMUNICATIONS AND CONSULAR SERVICES WOULD BE STRAINED AT TIME WHEN DEMANDS IN BOTH AREAS WOULD BE INCREASING.

21. (1) DECISION UNIT: SUDAN

22. (2) PACKAGE III OF IV

23. (3) ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION: ALL ACTIVITIES CURRENTLY

CONDUCTED BY EMBASSY WOULD BE CONTINUED IN SUPPORT OF
AGREED MAJOR POLICY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.

NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 MMO-01 SIG-03 A-01 PER-01 ABF-01
SS-15 SP-02 AID-05 PC-01 OES-07 NSC-05 /053 W
-----015647 040858Z /11

R 031021Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7255

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 5 KHARTOUM 1999

24. (4) RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FY 78 FY 79 FY 80

	THIS PCKG ONLY	CUMUL- ATIVE		
U.S. OFFICERS	10	10	-	10
U.S. STAFF	12	12	-	12
FSL'S	34	34	-	34
TOTAL	56	56	-	56

25. (5) IMPACT ON CURRENT U.S. POLICY GOALS, OBJECTIVES
AND ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES: WHILE PRESENT LEVEL ACTIVITIES
COULD BE CONTINUED ANTICIPATED INCREASED DEMAND FOR ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL REPORTING AND BUSINESS AND CONSULAR SERVICES
WOULD STRAIN EMBASSY RESOURCES. MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM WOULD
BE INABILITY TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES TO EXPANDED
NON-STATE ELEMENTS OF MISSION SO THAT EVEBT5'7 285# 100 PERCENT
OF PRESENT STAFFING IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO
IMPLEMENT AID PROGRAM AS PRESENTLY CONCEIVED.

26. (1) DECISION UNIT: SUDAN

27. (2) PACKAGE IV OF IV

28. (3) ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION: AT THIS LEVEL THE EMBASSY
CAN PROVIDE THE MINIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT REQUIRED
TO CARRY OUT AID AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS CONSISTEN
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WITH IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO SUDAN AND IN KEEPING WITH OVERALL POLICIES TOWARD COUNTRY. MOREOVER, WE COULD ACCOMMODATE EXPECTED SMALL INCREASES IN DAO AND ICA AS WELL AS ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE CORPS, SHOULD THAT BE DESIRED. THIS WILL ALSO ALLOW FULL RANGE OF REPORTING, REPRESENTATION, CONSULAR AND BUSINESS SERVICES AND ADEQUATE MANAGEMENT, COORDINATION AND SUPERVISION OF VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE EMBASSY.

29. (4) RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FY 78 FY 79 FY 80

	THIS PCKG ONLY	CUMULA- TIVE	
U.S. OFFICERS	10	13	PLUS 3 (13
U.S. STAFF	12	15	PLUS 3 15
FSL'S	34	38	PLUS 4 38
TOTALS	56	66	PLUS 10 66

30. (5) IMPACT ON CURRENT U.S. POLICY, GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES: EXCEPT FOR NEW CONSULAR POSITION ALL NEW POSITIONS ARE IN JAO AND ARE NEEDED TO SUPPORT GENERAL EXPANSION OF EMBASSY, NOTABLY IN AID. SINCE MID-1976 THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT GROWTH IN EMBASSY WITH NO CONCOMITANT INCREASE IN ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF. RECENT ADDITIONS TO EMBASSY WILL ALLOW MISSION TO MEET HEAVY DEMAND FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPORTING AND RELATED SERVICES. FUTURE EXPANSION WILL BE PRIMARILY IN AID AND AMONG AID AND MILITARY CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL. THUS IT IS IN ADMINISTRATIVE AREA WHERE NEED IS MOSB URGENT AND ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL. THEREFORE, WITH ADDITIONAL RESOURCES ASSUMED IN THIS PACKAGE WE CAN GO FORWARD WITH WHOLE RANGE OF REPORTING, AND ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OVERALL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES. IN

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ADDITION WE CAN PROVIDE CONSULAR SERVICES THAT WILL BE NEEDED BY EXPANDING AMERICAN COMMUNITY.

31. IN ADDITION TO POINTS NOTED ABOVE IN PACKAGES I THROUGH IV WISH MAKE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS WITH RESPECT KHARTOUM IN TERMS POINTS RAISED PARA 10 REFTEL. POST ALREADY RELIES ON REGIONAL OFFICES AS MUCH AS FEASIBLE, AND IT HARD TO SEE HOW MUCH FURTHER THIS COULD BE DONE HERE. AS NOTED IN PACKAGE I WE SUGGEST ELIMINATION DCM POSITION UNDER 90 PERCENT RESOURCES LEVEL. SIMIRGRLY WE CALL FOR COMBINED ECON/

POL SECTION IN THAT CASE. ALSO SHOULD BE NOTED THAT EVEN AT PACKAGE IV LEVELS WE ENVISAGE, FOR EXAMPLE, CONSULAR OFFICER ASSISTING JAO. POST WILL USE NON-PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS WHERE FEASIBLE, BUT BASIC CORE OF FULL TIME CAREER PERSONNEL NEEDED AS WELL. GIVEN EXTREME SCARCITY QUALIFIED LOCAL PERSONNEL IN ALL AREAS (DUE LARGELY TO "BRAIN DRAIN" TOWARD SAUDI ARABIA AND GULF) USE OF LOCAL PERSONNEL IN LIEU OF AMERICANS NOT LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE OFTEN AS OPTION. ITEMS F THROUGH J EITHER ARE NOT POSSIBLE OR NOT APPLICABLE HERE.

32. FORM ZBB-1

1. TOTAL US PERSONNEL- 22
2. TOTAL FSL- 34
3. TOTAL PERSONNEL RESOURCES AT MISSION (1 AND 2) I.E.,
QUOTE CURRENT LEVEL UNQUOTE- 56
 - A. PACKAGE I (LINE 3 X 90 PERCENT) EQUALS 50
 - B. PACKAGE II (LINE 3 X 5 PERCENT) EQUALS 3
 - C. PACKAGE III (LINE 3 X 5 PERCENT) EQUALS 3

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 MMO-01 SIG-03 A-01 PER-01 ABF-01
SS-15 SP-02 AID-05 PC-01 OES-07 NSC-05 /053 W
-----015905 040903Z /21
R 031021Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7256

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 5 OF 5 KHARTOUM 1999

33. FORM ZBB-2 PACKAGE WORKSHEET:

ZERO-BASE BUDGETING

FY 1980

PERSONNEL RESOURCE WORKSHEET

(LEFT HALF OF CHART)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

PACKAGE I

AMER FY-78 AMER AMER

FUNCTION OFF. AMER OFF. STAFF FSL

STAFF FSL

EXEC 2 2 1 1 1 1

POL	2	2	-	1	2	-
E/C	3	1	4	3	1	3
CONS	1	-	2	1	-	2
ADMIN	2	7	27--	2	7	25

(INCLUDES 4)
(POSITIONS TRANS-
K FERRED TO AID)

TOTAL THIS
PACKAGE 10 12 34 8 11 31
CUMULATIVE
TOTAL 10 12 34 8 11 31
(CENTER OF CHART)

(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
PACKAGE II			PACKAGE III		
AMER	AMER		AMER	AMER	

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OFF	STAFF	FSL	OFF	STAFF	FSL
-----	-------	-----	-----	-------	-----

EXEC	-	-	-	-	-
POL	-	-	-	-	-
E/C	-	-	1	-	-
CONS	-	-	-	-	-
ADMIN	-	-	3	-	-

TOTAL THIS
PACKAGE - - 3 - - -
CUMULATIVE
TOTAL 10 12 31 10 12 34
(RIGHT OF CHART)

(14)	(15)	(16)
AMER	AMER	FSL
OFF	STAFF	

EXEC	2	2	1
POL	2	2	-
E/C	3	1	4
CONS	2	-	2
ADMIN	4	10	31

TOTAL THIS PLUS 3 PLUS 3 PLUS 4
PACKAGE
CUMULATIVE
TOTAL 13 15 38

34. IN ADDITION TO INCREASING EXPENSES RELATED TO GROWTH OF EMBASSY AND GREATER ACTIVITY AT POST, WE HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO RAPID INFLATION, PARTICULARLY IN HOUSING. SIMILARLY, HARSH ENVIRONMENT, DEARTH OF ADEQUATE REPAIR/ MAINTENANCE CAPABILITIES, DAMAGE RESULTING FROM BEING AT END OF LONG, UNCERTAIN LOGISTICAL PIPELINE AND OTHER LOCAL HAZARDS ALSO AFFECT COSTS. AS RESULT THESE FACTORS OVERALL OPERATING BUDGET OF EMBASSY HAS INCREASED 42 PERCENT IN PAST TWO YEARS, THAT IS SINCE RELATIONS HAVE BEEN NORMALIZED

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AND PERIOD RAPID GROWTH BEGAN. POST HAS RATHER SMALL, SPARTAN PLANT. CHANCERY IS AN EMBARRASSMENT. COMMERCIAL LIBRARY CONSISTS OF ONE ROOM IN E/C SECTION. AUTOMATION OF CONSULAR SECTION NOT EVEN BEING CONTEMPLATED AT THIS STAGE.

35. EVEN ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION FUNDING BELOW FY 78 LEVEL WILL REQUIRE CUTBACK ON PROGRAMS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN REPRESENTATIONAL AREA. ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE OR RATIONALIZE EQUIPMENT AND FURNISHINGS AND TO GET ORDERLY PROCUREMENT PROGRAM UNDERWAY WOULD BE DEALT SEVERE BLOW. WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT NEW PROGRAMS. SIMILARLY, CONTINUED FUNDING AT FY 78 LEVEL WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT NEW PROGRAMS. PRESUMABLY WE COULD CONTINUE OPERATIONS AT PRESENT LEVEL, BUT THAT STILL WOULD NOT ALLOW US TO CARRY OUT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES PARTICULARLY IN ICA, AID AND MILITARY AREAS. PRESENT CHANCERY IS UTTERLY INADQUATE AND IMPROVEMENTS IN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE URGENTLY NEEDED. WITHOUT INCREASED FUNDING NEW CHANCERY AND RESIDENCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS COULD NOT PROCEED. WITH INCREASED FUNDING, HOWEVER, THESE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT BUILDING PROGRAMS COULD MOVE FORWARD, EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING PROCUREMENT PROGRAM COULD BE CONDUCTED IN ORDERLY MANNER GAINING SAVINGS IN LONG RUN AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, EMBASSY COULD PROVIDE NON-STATE ELEMENTS SUPPORT NEEDED FOR NEW PROGRAMS.

36. RESPONSE TO PART II REFTTEL BEING SUBMITTED SEPTTEL.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: REPORTS, FOREIGN RELATIONS, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 may 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978KHARTO01999
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780190-0210
Format: TEL
From: KHARTOUM
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780598/aaaadfvi.tel
Line Count: 583
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: af3c23a5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 63477
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2807409
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: GOALS/OBJECTIVES AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM- PART I
TAGS: PEPR, AMGT, SU
To: STATE
Type: TE
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